Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, as he later became, was a senior officer in the British Army. In the Second World War, he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), the professional head of the UK and Commonwealth forces. In this role he had to co-ordinate British resources and military efforts toward the 1945 Allied victory. As head of the Chiefs of Staff Committee he also had to prepare plans and provide detailed advice for politicians, notably UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill. It was clearly a hugely responsible and demanding task and one he managed with enormous skill. Alanbrooke made what by any standards was an outstanding contribution to the British state. Yet his role is often neglected or even ignored in popular histories and media coverage of WWII.
Early years
Alan Francis Brooke was born on 23rd July
1883 at Bagnères-de-Bigorre, Hautes-Pyrénées in southern France. Every bit the
product of late-Victorian Britain, he was the seventh and youngest child of Sir
Victor Brooke, 3rd Baronet, head of a wealthy Anglo-Irish Protestant family
from Fermanagh in western Ulster. They had a long record of military service from
the 17th century as the “Fighting Brookes of Colebrook”. His mother
was the former Alice Bellingham, second daughter of Sir Alan Bellingham, third
Baronet of Castle Bellingham in County Louth. Brooke’s father died of pneumonia
age 48 when Alan was just eight years old.
His parents had been living in the area for a while, having left Ireland and settled in a villa at Pau, in the Pyrenees. Alan went
to school locally and not to a boarding school, as would normally have been the
case for most children of his social class. He stayed in Pau until he was 16. Bi-lingual
in French (with a heavy Gascon accent), and English, he spoke both languages very
fast. He was also fluent in German. Later he learnt Urdu and Persian.
From a military family the option was clear, if limited. He was sent to England but only just got into the Woolwich Royal Military Academy, coming 65th of 72 examinees. But he progressed, passing out in 17th place.
Artillery Officer and instructor
On Christmas Eve 1902, 19 year old Alan Brooke was commissioned into the Royal Regiment of Artillery as a second lieutenant. He served in Ireland and India as a young officer before the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Posted to the Western Front with the Royal Artillery he won a reputation for operations planning, later being transferred to the 18th Division. At the Somme, in 1916, he introduced the ‘creeping barrage’ system, borrowed from the French, to help protect advancing infantry. He was with the Canadians in 1917 when at Vimy the idea was famously proved in a major battle. 1918 saw him appointed the senior artillery staff officer in the First Army. He ended the war as a lieutenant-colonel with the DSO, six times mentioned in despatches.
Battle of Vimy Ridge
In 1919 Brooke attended the first post war course at Camberley Staff College, and served as a staff officer with the 50th Division from 1920 to 1923. As an instructor at Camberley and then at the Imperial Defence College he got to know most of the officers who became commanders in World War II. From 1929 he was Inspector of Artillery, Director of Military Training, and then General Officer Commanding of the Mobile (later first Armoured) Division. Promoted to lieutenant-general in 1938 he took charge of the Anti-Aircraft Command. There he built a strong relationship with Hugh Dowding, head of Fighter Command, laying a basis for co-operation in the Battle of Britain. In July 1939 Brooke moved to head Southern Command when he was seen as among the Army’s leading generals.
British Corps Commander in World War II
On the outbreak of war Brooke commanded II Corps in
the British Expeditionary Force in France. He was pessimistic about the Allies’
chances against a German offensive and sceptical about the quality, discipline
and determination of the French and Belgian forces. He didn’t rate Lord Gort,
BEF Commander in Chief, either, whom he thought was obsessed with details and
incapable of broad strategic thinking. Gort in turn thought Brooke a pessimist
and considered replacing him. Brooke felt his force would likely be outflanked in
May 1940 by a Wehrmacht advance along the Meuse but the British High Command
dismissed this warning as defeatist.
The II Corps faced rapid German armoured advances
after the Allied defeat at Sedan. With the Belgian army capitulating, Brooke
and Gen Ritchie acted quickly to cover the BEF retreat, moving Montgomery’s 3rd
Division north to plug a 20 mile gap. II Corps could then withdraw to Dunkirk. Brooke
not only saved his own forces but also prevented the Germans from seizing the
gap left by the Belgian surrender and capturing the entire BEF. In all, 338,000
British, French and Belgian troops were rescued. Gen Brian Horrocks later
argued, “The more I have studied this campaign the clearer it becomes that the
man who really saved the BEF was our own corps commander, Gen Brooke...it is
only now that I realise fully just how great he was”.
In the midst of the evacuation, Gort ordered Brooke to
return home. The Corps was left in Montgomery’s hands. Montgomery said Brooke,
overcome with emotion at having to leave his men in this crisis, “broke down
and wept”. Tasked with “re-forming new armies” on June 2nd he was
told by Sir John Dill (CIGS) to return to France with a new BEF. Brooke said it
was “one of the blackest moments in the war”. 200,000 Allied troops were still
based in Brittany but Gen Weygand had told him the French Army was collapsing
and could resist no more. Sending further troops was absurd as “the mission had
no military value and no hope of success”. Brooke wanted a planned withdrawal
to Cherbourg and Brest for transfer to Britain. Churchill objected but Brooke
stood firm. His view eventually prevailed.
Commander UK Home Forces
While his considered stand based on direct experience
of the conflict was at odds with Churchill’s gung ho psyche Brooke seemed to
gain credit with the PM. He was appointed to command UK Home Forces in charge
of the country’s defence preparations against invasion. He developed a mobile
reserve to counterattack enemy forces before they were established. By delaying
landings as far as possible he thought the situation “far from helpless”. The
War Cabinet in fact knew from intelligence and military analysis that a German
invasion was highly unlikely and would have been suicidal had it happened. The
Germans had done no proper planning, had no suitable landing craft and could
not have re-supplied the few troops that managed to land.
Luftwaffe messages had been decrypted and as key
loading bays in Holland had been closed in August 1940, it was clear that any
invasion idea had been abandoned. Hitler himself was not keen, and provided
Britain maintained air superiority - via radar, a high rate of aircraft
building and the Battle of Britain victory in August-September 1940 - it was nigh impossible for
Germany to succeed. It’s not clear that Brooke realised this until much later. The
War Cabinet knew the score but used the threat to galvanise Britain’s people for
a long struggle ahead.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff
In December 1941 Brooke succeeded Dill as Chief of the
Imperial General Staff (CIGS). As Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee,
which he dominated by force of intellect and personality, he headed the overall
strategic direction of the British war effort. He was also charged with supervising
the military operations of the Free French, Polish, Dutch, Belgian and Czech
units under the exiled governments in London. He delegated most of the details
to subordinates, and focused on grand strategy, appointing senior commanders,
allocating manpower and equipment, and handling relations with allies, notably the US.
In 1940-41 Brooke’s focus had been on reorganising and
re-equipping home defence forces. Much of the Army’s equipment, armour and
supplies had been left behind in France. His diaries tell of endless trips to
inspect defensive units and appoint commanders. He worked hard here while
lobbying the government for weapons for his under-armed forces. But from 1942,
with the US fully in the war, his main role switched to global strategy. At the
London conference in April, he and Churchill apparently misled the Americans into
believing they backed an early landing in France, very difficult given the lack
of US preparedness and in particular the need for landing craft. This caused
some bad feeling with US Chief of Staff George Marshall.
Relations with US Allies
Brooke’s first thought was for the Mediterranean. Given
a shortage of tonnage, by keeping this sea lane free for Allied shipping via the Suez
Canal, it saved time and capacity in supply. But he found it hard to convince
the Americans of this priority. They saw an imperial mindset at play. Though he’d been offered the command of
British forces in the Middle East and would normally have jumped at the chance,
he declined. He felt it was more important to ‘baby sit’ Churchill who was tempted
to rash and absurd strategic initiatives. Brooke, rightly, thought he
knew better than anyone how to deal with Churchill.
In summer 1942 the PM’s choice to lead the Eighth Army
in North Africa was William Gott. Brooke’s was Bernard Montgomery, his ex-pupil
and protégé. Gott was killed in a plane crash so the job went to Montgomery, to
Brooke’s relief. Despite the Allies’ success in North Africa, it was clear that
a second front in France would be difficult. In January 1943 at Casablanca the
endless arguments between Britain and the US were seemingly resolved. The
Allies would invade Sicily under Dwight Eisenhower’s command, effectively
postponing a French invasion. With US forces still smaller than Britain’s Roosevelt
leant on his military, some of whom wanted to confine themselves to the Pacific
theatre. The compromise was brokered by Dill, Chief of the UK’s Washington Staff
Mission. Brooke was very grateful to him.
At times Churchill seemed ambivalent on this crucial
question. But Brooke stood firm, confident he was backed by logic. First it was
vital to defeat Nazi Germany. The Allies hadn’t yet the forces or supply lines
strong enough. With the Atlantic U-Boat depredations on Allied shipping, there
was a shortage of a million tonnes. By keeping the Mediterranean and Suez open,
the available capacity would be roughly doubled, mainly due to time saving with
importing supplies from India and the Far East. The Allies would all benefit.
On top of this, Axis member Italy might be knocked out. And it would at least
take some pressure off Russia, where Stalin was screaming for a second front.
In the strategy meetings throughout 1942 and 1943 the
atmosphere was often heated. Brooke was terse, with sharp opinions, quick in
mind and with clipped speech. It didn’t always go down well with the Americans.
In one instance a US General demanded an invasion against well trained and
equipped German forces at what seemed the shortest French route. He exclaimed
that these landings would end the war. Replied Brooke, “Yes, but not necessarily with the result we want”.
Brooke was clear that the Allies would not be ready in
1943. This was later confirmed by US Gen Bradley. The problem was explaining and
justifying it to the War Cabinet, but it seems this was relatively easy. The
bigger difficulty was with the US military, and most of all, Stalin and the
Soviets. Some aid was reaching them from the US and UK - including via the
dangerous Arctic convoy route - but Stalin, under enormous pressure from losses
to the Nazi war machine, remained boorishly ungrateful. Brooke feared a Soviet
collapse, but his admiration for Stalin was among his poorest judgements.
The Churchill Burden
Still, Churchill was Brooke’s heaviest burden, a cross he felt he had to bear for the whole of the war. He clearly admired Churchill for the power of his personality, his rhetorical flair in the English
language, handling the Americans, and his ability to unite most of the
country. But Brooke spent much time and effort dealing with his foibles, his
‘strategic ideas’, and his cavalier working style - long heavy drinking spells
in Churchill’s company at home and abroad, trying to save the war effort from
the PM’s wild fancies. The stress is clear from reading his diaries.
From October 1943 Admiral Cunningham was a firm ally
among the Chiefs of Staff. Still, when Churchill’s many absurd notions clashed
with military reality it was Brooke who always confronted the PM. Churchill’s
obsession with Norway kept re-appearing and he was keen on other fanciful
initiatives - like Madagascar, the Greek islands and Sumatra. All these ideas
were strategically useless and would have cost precious lives and resources.
Brooke had to spend a lot of time and effort to kill them off. It all played on his
nerves.
Problems with colleagues
Montgomery was his protégé and Brooke liked and
defended him against criticism from the Americans and Churchill. Montgomery was
slow, famously never advancing unless he had superior manpower, air power and
fire power. This annoyed the Americans in Italy and after the D-Day invasion.
Brooke backed Montgomery, but also frequently reprimanded his socially inept and
egotistical colleague. He was inclined to be rude and wildly undiplomatic to the American allies,
notably over the Battle of the Bulge. Brooke also believed Operation Market
Garden (Arnhem) to be an error of judgement - it would have been better to secure Antwerp first
than to drive through Holland. He also thought Gen Alexander ‘not bright’ and
Mountbatten, with his ice battleship illusions, a waste of time.
Brooke had hoped to take command of the Allied
invasion of France. He said Churchill had promised him this three times. The
job went to Eisenhower. The US’ contribution had overtaken that of the UK by
then, so it was inevitable. But Brooke felt he’d been passed over and resented
the way Churchill had let him know. His 10 September 1944 diary entry reads:
...the wonderful thing is that ¾ of the
population of the world imagine that Churchill is one of the Strategists of
History, a second Marlborough, and the other ¼ have no idea what a public
menace he is and has been throughout the war!”.
Post War
Brooke left the Army in 1945. His diaries were
published in 1959. Lord Alanbrooke as he now was, had not planned this but wanted
to correct the writings of others, including Churchill, who had taken the
credit for Alanbrooke’s work. The editor, Arthur Bryant, cut out much source
material. The work is now seen as ‘faltering under the weight of heavy editing
and inadequate context’. But many of those criticised were still living. Churchill, almost deified by the public, didn’t appreciate it. In 2001 Alex
Danchev of Keele, and Daniel Todman of Cambridge University published a
revised, well regarded version.
The Brooke family had moved into a house at Hartley
Wintney, near Aldershot. They were not well off and later moved to the gardener’s
cottage. Brooke’s first wife was Ulster neighbour Jane Richardson. They had two
children, but Jane died after a car crash in 1925 when Alan had been driving.
He blamed himself throughout his life. In 1929 he married Benita Lees and they
had two children, Kathleen and Victor. Kathleen died as a result of a riding
accident in 1961. Brooke took various posts in the private sector and among other activities followed
his interest in ornithology and photography.
